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Rando: Reconstituting the United States: Could an Article V Convention P

RECONSTITUTING THE UNITED STATES: COULD AN
ARTICLE V CONVENTION PREVENT THE NEXT JANUARY 6?
Paul G. Rando*
“[T]here is no place for violence in a democratic society
dedicated to liberty under law . . . .”1
“What will finally unite Americans?
A great crisis that leaves us no choice but to come together.”2

I. INTRODUCTION: PLASTIC HOURS
During the year leading up to the 2020 presidential election, the United
States was nearing a so-called “plastic hour,” a time when institutional
inertia breaks down enough that it becomes possible to effect profound
change. 3 This period was marked by an absence of solidarity and a
growing divide between the disparate factions of politics in the United
States, and by problems brought on by the coronavirus pandemic,
including the associated economic downturn.4 Scholars suggest that for
such a period to transform into a plastic hour that triggers lasting social
change powerful enough to ensure a peaceful end to violent times,
requires a catalyst, or a crisis.5
After a contentious election cycle, an election day followed by months
of litigation,6 and concerns of a hostile takeover by the losing party,7
*Editor-in-Chief, University of Cincinnati Law Review. Thank you to my peers Lisa Rosenof, Austin
Wishart, Caleigh Harris, and Danny O’Connor, as well as Professors Louis D. Bilionis and Bert
Lockwood. Thanks are also due the editorial team, and to Keeley Gogul, who was exceedingly patient
and whose advice was invaluable, unassailable, and transformative.
1. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 574 (1965).
2. Historian Joseph J. Ellis, in response to a question posed, by TIME Magazine journalist Lucas
Wittmann, about a natural catastrophe. See Lucas Wittmann, Best-Selling Historian Joseph J. Ellis
Explains What the Founding Fathers Got Wrong, TIME MAG. (Oct. 18, 2018),
https://time.com/5428184/joseph-ellis-founding-fathers-trump/ [https://perma.cc/Q7FQ-Y4CE].
3. George Packer, Make America Again, ATLANTIC 48 (Oct. 2020), theatlantic.com/magazine/ar
chive/2020/10/make-america-again/615478/; see also ILAN STAVANS, ART AND ANGER 79 (2001)
(defining a plastic hour as “an instant in life in which a single insight might provoke a whole re-evaluation
of our worldview.”).
4. Packer, supra note 3.
5. Id.
6. See, e.g., Russell Wheeler, Trump’s Judicial Campaign to Upend the 2020 Election: A Failure,
But Not a Total Wipeout, BROOKINGS INST. (Nov. 30, 2021) (finding a win rate of only 1.5% among the
sixty-odd
lawsuits
filed
that
challenged
the
results
of
the
2020
election),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2021/11/30/trumps-judicial-campaign-to-upend-the-2020election-a-failure-but-not-a-wipe-out/ [https://perma.cc/P8N6-R5DF].
7. See, e.g., Fact Check: Trump Did Not Tweet Declaring Martial Law, REUTERS (Dec. 23,
2020),
https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-factcheck-fake-trump-tweet-martial/fact-check-trump-did-
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America’s plastic hour seemed to materialize on January 6, 2021 (“Jan.
6”). That afternoon, political junkies turned on their news outlet of choice
expecting nothing more thrilling than the certification of electoral votes
to confirm Joe Biden as the next President of the United States (albeit,
perhaps, with a bit of political showboating). Instead, some twenty-nine
million Americans watched supporters of former President Trump storm
the U.S. Capitol building, threatening both the certification process and
the lawmakers involved in carrying it out.8 For the first time in living
memory, violence nearly managed to overthrow the seat of U.S.
government established by the Constitution almost 250 years ago. 9 When
the attackers breached the Capitol, Congress was counting votes –– but
the rioters did not ultimately stop the certification. Even so, a continuing
threat of more politically motivated, constitutional violence now lingers.
In the wake of the Jan. 6 attack, there has been little in the way of
profound social change, despite the new administration’s ambitious
agenda. 10 Section II of this Comment attributes the lack of profound social
change to the notion that Jan. 6 was not a plastic hour at all, but merely
the most sensational symptom of a larger constitutional crisis which is
currently underway in the United States. This crisis is defined in part by
the looming threat of further large-scale violence that could still threaten
or disrupt the nation’s governmental system as outlined in the
Constitution. Section II crafts an overview of the crisis, describing
constitutional violence, gripping political gridlock, and polarization.
If Jan. 6 was not the plastic hour, then the opportunity remains for
social change on a level necessary to quell the crisis. On the basis of the
constitutional crisis and all its facets, and the potential that more violence
will erupt unless a peaceful solution is implemented, this Comment seeks
a peaceful solution. In this same vein, it asks: is an Article V constitutional
convention the ideal method to resolve the crisis? In theory, a convention
could be the peaceful, consensus-building solution to the needs of a nation
nearing disaster. If the larger constitutional crisis is the real “plastic hour,”
then perhaps the solution ought to be equally monumental. But drastic
not-tweet-declaring-martial-law-idUSKBN28X2HE [https://perma.cc/234W-3KUP]. Though Reuters
determined that the martial law tweet was fake, the President’s tweet certainly caused a fair amount of
worry. See Jazmin Goodwin, Trump’s Talk of Martial Law Sends White House Staffers Rushing to the
Press, CNN BUS. (Dec. 21, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/12/20/media/stelter-trump-martiallaw/index.html [https://perma.cc/7VFH-QAW7].
8. Mark Joyella, Attack on Capitol Pushes CNN to its Most-Watched Day in History, FORBES
(Jan. 7, 2021), https://www.forbes.com/sites/markjoyella/2021/01/07/attack-on-capitol-pushes-cnn-toits-most-watched-day-in-history/?sh=1eaac9c73121.
9. Ronald G. Shafer, Congress Investigated an Attack on the Capitol 200 Years Ago. It Didn’t
Go Well, WASH. POST (Oct. 20, 2021) (detailing the British attack on Washington, D.C. during the War
of
1812),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/history/2021/10/20/war-1812-capitol-attack-congress/
[https://perma.cc/AP9L-VFLC].
10. See, e.g., Packer, supra note 3.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol91/iss2/9

2

Rando: Reconstituting the United States: Could an Article V Convention P

564

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 91

times may not call for such drastic measures.
To answer this Comment’s central question, Section III imagines a
hypothetical convention, highlights many of the unknown factors
involved in running one, and considers how the risks introduced in
Section II might play out. Ultimately, Section IV concludes that, based on
the foregoing discussion, an Article V convention would be insufficient
to prevent another instance of constitutional violence –– let alone to
address the larger constitutional crisis –– and proposes a middle road
between the extreme measure of a constitutional convention and taking
no action at all.
II. BACKGROUND: CONSTITUTION IN CRISIS
The term “constitutional crisis” evades clear definition.11 Generally, it
is a moment in which the very fabric of a constitutional system frays,
either because political disputes cannot be peaceably resolved within the
system’s framework, or because significant political figures are unwilling
to uphold their constitutional obligations.12 This Section argues that the
United States is in the midst of such a crisis.
In Part A, this Section situates Jan. 6 firmly in the context of
constitutional violence, a particular form of politically-motivated
violence. Next, Part B discusses the state of the Constitution today—how
it is viewed, who it represents, and how things have changed since Jan. 6.
Then, Part C discusses the futility of constitutional amendment via
Congress, the risks of a constitutional convention, and a potential third
avenue.
A. Constitutional Violence: January 6, 2021
In the Declaration of Independence, Thomas Jefferson wrote that life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness are inalienable rights, and that
“whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends,
it is the Right of the People to alter or abolish it, and to institute new
Government . . . .”13 Throughout American history, many have attempted
11. Sean Illing, How Do We Know if We’re in a Constitutional Crisis? 11 Experts Explain, VOX
(May 16, 2019) (“There’s no set of agreed-upon conditions, no ultimate standard that indicates when a
country has officially entered into a constitutional crisis.”) https://www.vox.com/2019/5/16/18617661/do
nald-trump-congress-constitutional-crisis.
12. Id.; see also Constitutional Crisis, GOOGLE DICTIONARY, https://www.google.com/search?q=
constitutional+crisis+definition&oq=constitutional+crisis&aqs=chrome.1.69i59j35i39j0i512l3j69i60l2j
69i61.3941j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8 [https://perma.cc/6H2H-YB77] (last visited Apr. 23,
2022) (“a situation in which a major political dispute cannot be clearly resolved on the basis of the
particular government’s constitution or established practice”).
13. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
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to alter the government the Constitution created, some by amendment and
others by violence.14
The latter phenomenon is referred to as constitutional violence: 15
disorder that threatens to alter or disrupt the form and operation of the
United States government. Contrast constitutional violence with “merely”
political violence, which may be about any matter of politics or any issue
of the day.16 There is a significant amount of overlap between the two
ideas.17 Direct attacks on federal government officials and buildings, for
example, could fall into either category.18 Because constitutional violence
is a subset of political violence, every instance of constitutional violence
is political violence, just as every square is a rectangle. But the inverse
does not always hold true.
Violence has played a “pivotal role” in shaping the United States into
the country it is today.19 As an attempt to prevent the peaceful transition
of power to the newly-elected President of the United States by halting
the certification of votes, Jan. 6 was an act of constitutional violence.
Inside the Capitol Building, at 1:00 in the afternoon, the people of
Congress tallied votes from the 2020 presidential election, overseen by
then-Vice President Mike Pence, acting pursuant to Article II of the U.S.
Constitution.20 Earlier that day, the Vice President’s office had issued a
statement declaring Pence’s intention to honor the tradition of certifying

14. See, e.g., F.E. Guerra-Pujol, Domestic Constitutional Violence, 41 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.
REV. 211 (2019).
15. Some scholars use this or similar phrases (“violence of constitution”) to describe a distinct but
related type of violence: conflicts that result in the formation of new governments, such as the American
and French revolutions in the eighteenth century. Such violence is more in the vein of “to abolish” than
“to alter” and is not the of the type contemplated in this Comment. See generally David Bates,
Constitutional Violence, 34 J.L. & SOC’Y 14 (2007).
16. See, e.g., Darel E. Paul, America’s History of Political Violence, FIRST THINGS (Jan. 7, 2021)
(In the United States, “[r]iots against abolitionists, blacks, immigrants, Catholics, the military draft, war,
capitalists, capitalism, [and] police . . . are too numerous to list.”), https://www.firstthings.com/webexclusives/2021/01/americas-history-of-political-violence [https://perma.cc/UEG7-WBUR]. For a more
specific example, consider Cooper v. Aaron, the Supreme Court case concerning an uprising in Little
Rock, Arkansas, in protest against Brown v. Board of Education’s mandate to desegregate schools. The
uprising was so violent that it caused President Eisenhower to call in the National Guard. The Court in
Cooper upheld its decision in Brown. See Guerra-Pujol, supra note 14; Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18
(1958).
17. See, e.g., Paul, supra note 16 (“In 1954 a group of Puerto Rican nationalists used semiautomatic pistols to shoot five U.S. Representatives on the floor of the House. Bombs were planted and
exploded inside the Capitol building in 1971 and again in 1983.”).
18. Id.
19. Guerra-Pujol, supra note 14.
20. U.S. CONST. art. II (“The President of the Senate shall, in the Presence of the Senate and House
of Representatives, open all the Certificates, and the Votes shall then be counted.”); see also Jacqueline
Alemany et al., Key Findings of the Post’s Jan. 6 Investigation, WASH. POST (2021),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/interactive/2021/jan-6-insurrection-capitol/
[https://perma.cc/WC94-ERTK] (last visited Nov. 20, 2022).
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votes, 21 instead of bowing to pressure from the Trump Administration
and others to disqualify votes against President Trump, thereby making
President Trump the winner.22
While Congress counted votes, President Trump was finishing a speech
on the Ellipse near the White House, to a crowd of approximately 120,000
supporters.23 During the speech, President Trump told his listeners, “[W]e
are determined to defend and preserve government of the people, by the
people and for the people. . . . [I]f you don’t fight like Hell, you’re not
going to have a country any more [sic].”24 He concluded by sending the
crowd “to the Capitol and we’re going to try and give . . . our
Republicans . . . the kind of pride and boldness that they need to take back
our country.”25
Many of the events that followed have been seared into the American
collective memory. Rioters overwhelmed police officers struggling to
barricade the Capitol steps, and smashed windows to gain entry.26 A selfproclaimed “patriot warrior” in the crowd stole the baton of an officer
who was then beaten and maced. 27 Capitol Police Officer Eugene
Goodman escorted Senator Mitt Romney to safety and led the attackers
away from the Congressional chambers, and the House adjourned to seek
safety.28 Then Goodman, pursued by an armed mob who was taunting
him, proceeded to lead the attackers away from the Senate chambers and
the small ceremonial office where Mike Pence hid. 29
21. Letter from Michael Pence, Vice President of the United States, to Congress (Jan. 6, 2021) (“I
do not believe that the Founders of our country intended to invest the Vice President with unilateral
authority to decide which electoral votes should be counted. . . . ”) (available at Pence’s Letter to Congress
on Jan. 6, 2021, WASH. POST (Oct. 29, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/context/pence-s-letterto-congress/a73a4363-4bae-42ff-9177-7816806c0227/ [https://perma.cc/8R7W-34PP]).
22. Alemany et al., supra note 20 (showing that in the lead-up to Jan. 6, President Trump increased
pressure on Vice President Pence and “embraced a cast of renegade lawyers who argued that Pence could
reject electors from a handful of states and, ultimately, nullify Biden’s victory.”).
23. Alemany et al., supra note 20; see also William M. Arkin, Exclusive: Classified Documents
Reveal
the Number of
January 6 Protestors,
NEWSWEEK
(Dec. 23, 2021),
https://www.newsweek.com/exclusive-classified-documents-reveal-number-january-6-protestors1661296 [https://perma.cc/YM9T-F554] (claiming the crowd was six times larger than law enforcement
anticipated).
24. Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Trump’s Insurrection: Pandemic Violence, Presidential Incitement and
the Republican Guarantee, 11 U. MIAMI RACE & SOC. JUST. L. REV. 7, 11 (2021) (citing Trump’s Speech
That ‘Incited’ Capitol Violence: Full Transcript, AL JAZEERA (Jan. 11, 2021),
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/1/11/full-transcript-donald-trump-january-6-incendiary-speech)
(emphasis added).
25. Id. (emphasis added).
26. Alemany et al., supra note 20.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. Vice President Pence was later taken to an underground loading dock to hide. See C. Ryan
Barber, Mike Pence Stayed For Hours in a Capitol Loading Dock on January 6, Secret Service Confirms
at an Accused Rioter’s Trial, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 21, 2022), https://www.businessinsider.com/secret-
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Later, rioters entered the Senate chamber, now empty of legislators.30
Some, including the infamous QAnon Shaman (Jacob Anthony
Chansley), approached the well, carrying a Trump flag, and joined in
prayer thanking God “for filling this chamber with patriots.”31
Meanwhile, inside the House chamber, lawmakers hid behind their
bulletproof seats and wore gas masks against the threat of tear gas. 32 At
this point, President Trump had yet to remark on the crowd of his
supporters who had invaded a government building during government
proceedings.33 It took the National Guard arriving—some five hours after
the attackers first breached the Capitol barricades—to quash the mob.34
Five people were killed.35
Those who hoped the Commander-in-Chief would condemn the chaos
were disappointed. Former President Trump, who commands a broad
support base to this day, has a proven habit of actively encouraging or
tacitly approving of violence. For instance, half a year before Jan. 6, the
President had ordered the use of tear gas, rubber bullets, and threats of
military action to disperse peaceful Black Lives Matter protests. 36 Two
years prior to that, President Trump refused to outrightly condemn the
perpetrators of the violence in Charlottesville.37 The pattern continued on
Jan. 6. In transit from the Ellipse to the White House, President Trump
attempted to divert the vehicle to go to the Capitol, and had to be
physically restrained by a Secret Service agent.38 Several hours after the
rioters breached the Capitol, President Trump tweeted his praise for the
service-confirms-mike-pence-january-6-capitol-loading-dock-2022-3?op=1
[https://perma.cc/QQ5YB5ZJ].
30. Alemany et al., supra note 20.
31. Id. He did not mean the democratically-elected lawmakers who ordinarily legislate there.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Jill L. Goldenziel, “Revolution” at the Capitol: How Law Hindered the Response to the Events
of January 6, 2021, 81 MD. L. REV. 336, 345 (2021).
35. Iglesias, supra note 24 (citing Jack Healy, These Are the 5 People Who Died in the Capitol
Riot, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/11/us/who-died-in-capitol-buildingattack.html).
36. Iglesias, supra note 24.
37. See, e.g., Nancy Cook, Trump Fails to Condemn White Supremacists in Statement on
Charlottesville Violence, POLITICO, (Aug. 12, 2017) (“[H]e never . . . called the behavior of the white
supremacists unacceptable.”) https://www.politico.com/story/2017/08/12/trump-white-supremacistscharlottesville-violence-241575 [https://perma.cc/EJ9J-X7RJ]; David Smith et al., Donald Trump Refuses
to Condemn White Supremacists at Presidential Debate, GUARDIAN (Sept. 29, 2020) (“Trump said there
‘were very fine people, on both sides.’”), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/sep/29/trumpproud-boys-debate-president-refuses-condemn-white-supremacists.
38. Doina Chiacu & Rose Horowitch, Trump Tried to Grab Steering Wheel to Go to U.S. Capital
Jan 6 – Witness, Reuters (Jun. 28, 2022) (citing witness testimony at a Congressional hearing on President
Trump’s involvement with the Jan. 6 attack; reporting that President Trump said “I’m the effing president,
take me up to the Capitol now.”), https://www.reuters.com/world/us/trump-tried-grab-steering-wheel-gous-capitol-jan-6-witness-2022-06-28/.
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attackers, calling them “great patriots.”39 He told them to “go home with
love & in peace.”40 That same night, Congress resumed its business, and
at 3:24 in the morning, Vice President Pence formally declared Joseph
Biden the winner of the electoral vote count.41
In terms of constitutional violence, two features make Jan. 6 unique.
First, that it seriously disrupted a democratic process described in Article
II of the Constitution. The certification of votes is more than mere
formality — it is constitutional requirement.42 The Constitution does not
state that having one’s supporters violently interrupt the certification
process is an appropriate method for objecting to election results. The
method for peaceful, Congressional objection to election results is
outlined in the Electoral Count Act of 1887.43
The second, and potentially more significant unique factor about Jan.
6 is that it was endorsed by the acting President of the United States. Jan.
6 illustrates that the American constitutional system is in crisis. Political
disputes are being addressed with violent action instead of peaceful
resolution.44 In addition, the country’s democratically elected leader, who
four years earlier swore an oath to uphold and defend the Constitution of
the United States,45 violated that oath, and instead tacitly endorsed and
39.
40.
41.
42.

Alemany et al., supra note 20.
Id.
Id.
U.S. CONST. art. II, cl. 3.

And they shall make a List of all the Persons voted for, and of the Number of Votes for each;
which List they shall sign and certify . . . . The President of the Senate shall, in the Presence of the
Senate and House of Representatives, open all the Certificates, and the Votes shall then be
counted.
Id.
43. 3 U.S.C. § 15 (“Every objection shall be made in writing, and shall state clearly and concisely,
and without argument, the ground thereof, and shall be signed by at least one Senator and one Member of
the House of Representatives . . . .”).
44. For another example, take the 2017 “Unite the Right” rally in Charlottesville, Virginia, in
which right-wing extremists who carried tiki torches and the flags of hate groups such as the American
Nazi Party marched on Emancipation Park, ostensibly to protect a local statue of General Robert E. Lee
from being removed. Counter-protestors chanting “Black Lives Matter” were attacked, and one was killed
when one of the protestors drove his car into the crowd. See Dara Lind, Nazi Slogans and Violence at a
Right-Wing March in Charlottesville on Friday Night, VOX (Aug. 12, 2017),
https://www.vox.com/2017/8/12/16138132/charlottesville-rally-brawl-nazi; Deconstructing the Symbols
and Slogans Spotted in Charlottesville, WASH. POST (Aug. 18, 2017) (explaining the flags of the American
Nazi Party, Vanguard America, Identity Evropa, Southern Nationalists, and the Traditionalist Worker
Party, along with other symbology affiliated with white supremacy, including the Iron Cross, valkknot,
sonnenrad, the Confederate flag, and the flag of fictional country Kekistan),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2017/local/charlottesville-videos/ [https://perma.cc/QQL6T8SP]; Paul Duggan, Charge Upgraded to First-Degree Murder for Driver Accused of Ramming
Charlottesville Crowd, WASH. POST (Dec. 14, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/driv
er-accused-of-plowing-into-charlottesville-crowd-killing-heather-heyer-due-incourt/2017/12/13/6cbb4ce8-e029-11e7-89e8-edec16379010_story.html [https://perma.cc/LGH6-8AAV].
45. Lindsey Bever, ‘I, Donald John Trump…’: The 38 Most Momentous Words President Trump
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actively sought to aid in violence against constitutionally enumerated
procedures.46
B. The State of the Constitution
The Constitution has served as a guidepost and organizational
document for the American polity for nearly 250 years, but the needs of
today’s America are quite different from those of a fledgling nation during
the late eighteenth century.47 Thus, another element of the ongoing
constitutional crisis is the breakdown of the Constitution’s relevance to
modern American society, and of the inability for a government structured
by the Constitution to “insure domestic Tranquility.”48 Perhaps it is this
element which most inspires legal scholars to call for an Article V
convention.49 It may also be the element that makes a convention the most
risky.
Scholars claim the U.S. Constitution is all but unworkable in modern
times.50 Recent constitutional violence suggests they are right. It is a key
effect of today’s constitutional crisis that more violence is an everlooming possibility, and that the institutions meant to prevent and
overcome such crises are mired in gridlock while lawmakers edge further
apart, toward the poles of the political spectrum. This Part discusses the
Constitution’s current ability (or lack thereof) to maintain a peaceful
society and an operational government. The first sub-part discusses the
future likelihood of violence in the United States. The following sub-part
handles polarization and gridlock.

Said at His Inauguration, WASH. POST (Jan. 20, 2017) (quoting the former President’s oath of office: “I,
Donald John Trump, do solemnly swear that I will . . . to the best of my ability, preserve, protect and
defend the Constitution of the United States.”), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morningmix/wp/2017/01/20/i-do-solemnly-swear-the-35-most-momentous-words-donald-trump-will-say-at-hisinauguration/ [https://perma.cc/N5UP-A8HK].
46. See Iling, supra note 11; see also discussion on criminal affirmance, infra Section II(B)(1).
47. For one thing, the population has blossomed from less than ten million, to more than 330
million. See Aaron O’Neill, Population of the United States 1610-2020, STATISTA (Mar. 19, 2020),
https://www.statista.com/statistics/1067138/population-united-states-historical/ [https://perma.cc/T972Q38M]. Furthermore, what was once a collection of relatively independent agrarian states has molded
into an industrial national with a much more robust federal government. See generally ZINN, infra note
152.
48. U.S. CONST., pmbl.
49. See generally Sanford Levinson, So Much to Rewrite, So Little Time . . . ., 27 CONST.
COMMENT. 515 (2011).
50. Alex Seitz-Wald & National Journal, The U.S. Needs a New Constitution—Here’s How to
Write It, ATLANTIC (Nov. 2, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/11/the-us-needs-anew-constitution-heres-how-to-write-it/281090/ [https://perma.cc/9Q6X-67SF] (quoting University of
Texas Professor Sanford Levinson: “[The Constitution] gets close to a failing grade in terms of 21stcentury notions on democratic theory.”).
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1. After January 6, More Violence is on the Horizon
There is no provision in the Constitution that lists incitement of
violence as an appropriate method to solve internal political disputes, and
the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that there is no place for violence
in a democracy such as this one.51 Yet in the wake of Jan. 6, roughly onethird of all Americans believe that violence is already an appropriate
remedy when “elected leaders will not protect America.”52 The
Republican National Committee defended the Jan. 6 perpetrators as being
engaged in “legitimate political discourse.”53 Moreover, many Americans
believe that the country is heading toward a period of “mass violence, a
breakdown of federal authority, and the division of the country into
warring red and blue enclaves.”54
More specifically, the memory of the Jan. 6 attack may contribute to
further incitement of violence. To start, it is not out of the realm of
possibility that former President Trump will be prosecuted for his role on
Jan. 6 (despite surviving a post-presidency conviction trial in the Senate
after being impeached by the House).55 Congressional hearings
throughout summer 2022 revealed, to a greater extent at each session, the
degree of President Trump’s complicity in the attack.56 His conviction
would likely lead some of his opponents to call for more aggressive action
by the Department of Justice, while other commentators call for a more
51. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 574 (1965).
52. Daniel A. Cox, After the Ballots Are Counted: Conspiracies, Political Violence, and American
Exceptionalism, SURVEY CTR. ON AM. LIFE (Feb. 11, 2021), https://www.americansurveycenter.org/rese
arch/after-the-ballots-are-counted-conspiracies-political-violence-and-american-exceptionalism/
[https://perma.cc/XL93-N9SX].
53. Matthew Dallek, Prosecuting Trump Would Set a Risky Precedent. Not Prosecuting Would Be
Worse, WASH. POST (Feb. 18, 2022), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2022/02/18/trumpprosecute-risk-law/ [https://perma.cc/2TH9-D5B6].
54. Robert Kagan, Opinion, Our Constitutional Crisis is Already Here, WASH. P OST (Sept. 23,
2021),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/09/23/robert-kagan-constitutional-crisis/
[https://perma.cc/58N8-G67M]; see also Bruce Ackerman & Gerard Magliocca, Biden vs. Trump: The
Makings of a Shattering Constitutional Crisis, POLITICO (Feb. 01, 2022), https://www.politico.com/news/
magazine/2022/02/01/biden-trump-constitutional-crisis-00003959 [https://perma.cc/AXG7-6SXC] (foretelling widespread hysteria during, and as a result of, the 2024 presidential election).
55. David Rhode, The January 6th Criminal Case Against Donald Trump, NEW YORKER (Jan. 5,
2022), https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/the-january-6th-criminal-case-against-donaldtrump [https://perma.cc/MS6H-HL75] (“Despite [Attorney General] Garland’s attempts to divorce the
Justice Department from politically charged prosecutions, it is increasingly clear that investigating Trump
is becoming the defining issue of his tenure.”); see also Sam Levine & Lauren Gambino, Donald Trump
Acquitted in Second Impeachment Trial, GUARDIAN (Feb. 13, 2021), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2021/feb/13/donald-trump-acquitted-impeachment-trial.
56. See, e.g., Josh Dawsey, Analysis: Committee Shows How Trump Barreled Through Warnings,
WASH. POST (July 12, 2022), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/07/12/jan-6committee-hearings-live-updates-day-7/; see also Paul Kane, Analysis: Republicans Pleased With Trump
to Call of the Attack, WASH. POST (July 21, 2022), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nationalsecurity/2022/07/21/jan-6-committee-hearings-live-updates-day-8/.
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reserved approach.57 There is reason to believe that prosecuting President
Trump, or his top aides, for the events of Jan. 6 will cause his supporters
to commit further acts of violence.58 President Trump has already actively
praised events similar to Jan. 6, including the trucker convoy that shut
down traffic in Ottawa in protest of Canadian COVID-19 public health
measures. 59 It is also worth considering that Jan. 6 did not take place in a
historical vacuum; President Trump had a long-standing pattern of
encouraging violence amongst his supporters prior to Jan. 6, which
culminated in the Capitol attack.60 The pattern does not seem to have
ended on Jan 6., nor when Joe Biden took the presidential oath of office.
For example, in early 2022, Republican Representative Mo Brooks
revealed that President Trump had asked him to remove President Biden
from office and immediately “hold a new special election for the
presidency.”61 Such an idea could inspire violent support from President
Trump’s base as easily as the image of him in handcuffs could inspire
their violent outrage; it could equally be used by President Trump’s
detractors to justify violent opposition. There is no reason to suspect that
Jan. 6 marked an end to plotting by those responsible for planning it.
The options for legal consequences for Jan. 6 presents a Hobson’s
choice. 62 A decision by the Justice Department to avoid prosecuting
57. Rhode, supra note 55. One representative called A.G. Garland’s response “weak” and
“feckless,” while a former D.O.J. official urged Garland not to prosecute unless the facts and the law
supported such action, while adding that Garland shouldn’t “go easy on Trump.” Id.
58. Dallek, supra note 53 (“Indicting could trigger violence, spark a cycle of retribution once
Republicans take back power . . . .”). Signs that prosecution is imminent could also bolster President
Trump’s desire to seek reelection in 2024, in order to avoid criminal consequences for four more years.
See, e.g., Josh Marcus, Does New York Investigation Make it More Likely Trump Will Run Again in 2024
to Avoid Prosecution?, INDEPENDENT (Jan. 19, 2022), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/ameri
cas/us-politics/trump-2024-new-york-investigation-b1996682.html (discussing the criminal charges of
fraudulent business practices brought against President Trump by New York Attorney General Letitia
James, unrelated to the Jan. 6 attack).
59. Dallek, supra note 53. (“He praised the anti-public-health trucker convoy that shut down a key
bridge linking Detroit to Ontario and has wreaked havoc in Ottawa . . . before suggesting that the truckers
do the same in the United States, an even greater ‘tinderbox.’”).
60. See, e.g., Dallek, supra note 53. President Trump’s long history of sanctioning violence
includes “calling white supremacists in Charlottesville ‘fine people’; ordering the Proud Boys to ‘stand
back and stand by’ [when asked to condemn white supremacy during a presidential debate] . . . tweeting
‘liberate Michigan’ to followers a few months before a plot to kidnap and murder the state’s Democratic
governor.” Id.; Iglesias, supra note 24, at 9 (detailing President Trump’s dispersal of Black Lives Matter
protestors with tear gas and rubber bullets).
61. Brent D. Griffiths, Mo Brooks Says Trump Asked Him to ‘Immediately’ Remove Biden From
Office and Illegally Hold a New Presidential Election, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 23, 2022),
https://www.businessinsider.com/mo-brooks-says-trump-asked-him-to-immediately-remove-bidenfrom-office-and-illegally-hold-a-new-presidential-election-2022-3?utm_source=reddit.com
[https://perma.cc/ET6J-M7WY].
62. “An apparently free choice when there is no real alternative.” See Hobson’s Choice, MERRIAMWEBSTER,
https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/Hobson%27s%20choice#:~:text=Definition%20of%20Hobson's%20choice,or%
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President Trump may be just as dangerous as the alternative.63 Shortly
after Jan. 6, The Atlantic reported research from Penn State showing that
criminal affirmance (when the government tacitly condones dangerous
behavior by neglecting to prosecute its perpetrators) is especially strong
when the would-be defendant is amongst society’s elite.64 Thus, failing to
prosecute President Trump may be seen as implicit approval for the
attack,65 and may empower the groups responsible for the violence to
engage in more of it.66 As Representative Diana DeGette pointed out
during President Trump’s post-Jan. 6 Senate trial, “[I]n 2017, it was
unfathomable to many of us to think that Charlottesville could happen.”67
Yet, it did happen.68 And then the violent dispersal of Black Lives Matter
protests happened in Washington, D.C.69 Then Jan. 6. The idea that more
violence, or violence of a more extreme nature, seems “unfathomable” is
no reason to discount the possibility that it may nevertheless occur. The
nation’s stage is being set, claims the Washington Post, for chaos.70
“Imagine weeks of competing mass protests across multiple states as
lawmakers from both parties claim victory and charge the other with
unconstitutional efforts to take power.”71 Imagine civil war unfolding in
your hometown.
In fairness, the likelihood that constitutional violence will amount to
civil war seems small at this point, almost two years after Jan. 6. Polling

20more%20equally%20objectionable%20alternatives [https://perma.cc/ECD4-ZQKC] (last visited Apr.
23, 2022).
63. Grant Tudor & Ian Bassin, Don’t Be Scared of Prosecuting Trump, ATLANTIC (Jan. 14, 2021),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/01/prosecution-executive-branch/617647/
[https://perma.cc/AH2G-QAJ2]; see also Dallek, supra note 53 (noting that during Reconstruction,
governmental failure to prosecute the violent acts of white supremacists tacitly condoned such violence).
64. Tudor & Bassin, supra note 63 (citing Francesca Jensius & Abby Wood, Caught in the Act But
Not Punished: On Elite Rule of Law and Deterrence, 4 PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L AFFS. 686 (2016)).
65. Similarly, President Trump’s refusal to condemn the violence in Charlottesville constituted
approval of such drastic measures, and in part led to Jan. 6 itself.
66. Rachel Kleinfeld, The Rise of Political Violence in the United States, 32 J. DEMOCRACY 160
(2021) (“[D]omestic terrorists are emboldened by the belief that politicians encourage violence or that
authorities will tolerate it.”) (citing Arie Perliger, Terror Isn’t Always a Weapon of the Weak—It Can Also
Support the Powerful, CONVERSATION (Oct. 28, 2018), https://theconversation.com/terror-isnt-alwaysa-weapon-of-the-weak-it-can-also-support-the-powerful-82626),
https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/the-rise-of-political-violence-in-the-united-states/
[https://perma.cc/5HP6-YJEV].
67. Lisa Lerer, Donald Trump’s Impeachment Legacy: Violent Extremism, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/13/us/politics/donald-trump-impeachment.html [https://perm
a.cc/K3MA-CYZH].
68. Andrew Katz, Unrest in Virginia: Clashes Over a Show of White Nationalism in
Charlottesville Turn Deadly, TIME, https://time.com/charlottesville-white-nationalist-rally-clashes/
[https://perma.cc/3SY2-3Z9Q].
69. Iglesias, supra note 24, at 9.
70. Kagan, supra note 54.
71. Id.
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shows that an enormous majority of Americans (83%) disapprove of the
attack and think it posed a threat to democracy. 72 The pragmatic reader
will acknowledge, however, that merely disapproving of the
“unfathomable” does nothing to prevent is recurrence. After all, the
implication of the above poll is that some fifty-six million Americans
(17% of an approximate nationwide population of 329.5 million) did
approve of Jan. 6. Furthermore, even if what results is “only” more
politically-motivated constitutional violence that doesn’t amount to allout war,73 it’s still an ugly scene, and one well worth preventing if
prevention is possible.
2. Bipartisanship: A Relic of Congresses Past
These divisive issues are certain to contribute to the alreadyexasperating problem of Congressional gridlock –– the inability to pass
legislation. For many years, factors including, but not limited to, the rise
of social media have pushed Americans into insular bubbles that function
as echo chambers, reinforcing their own views and demonizing people
who view things differently.74 Polarization in the populace reflects in the
halls of Congress,75 where it manifests as increased partisanship and
legislative stalemate.76 The composition of the 117th Senate confirms that
Congress is in a state of gridlock: Republicans hold fifty seats, Democrats
hold forty-eight, and two Independents caucus with the Democrats,
making the division exactly even for the second time in only twenty

72. Brittany Shepher, Majority of Americans Think Jan. 6 Attack Threatened Democracy: POLL,
ABC NEWS (Jan. 2, 2022), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/majority-americans-jan-attack-threateneddemocracy-poll/story?id=81990555 [https://perma.cc/7KTM-LY4S]. An overwhelming majority (72%)
of Americans believe the people involved in the attack on the Capitol were "threatening democracy.” Id.;
see also Anthony Salvanto et al., CBS News Poll: A Year After Jan. 6, Violence Still Seen Threatening
U.S. Democracy, and Some Say Force Can Be Justified, CBS News (Jan. 2, 2022),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/january-6-opinion-poll-2022/ [https://perma.cc/ZG4B-PG45].
73. In the twenty-first century, it may be difficult to know when constitutional violence turns into
all-out war. Civil wars of this century (or, wars in general) tend not to involve Side A and Side B lining
up in nice lines to shoot each other with muskets, as in eighteenth century wars. See generally Yishai
Beer, Military Strategy: The Blind Spot of International Humanitarian Law, 8 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 333
(2017).
74. Andrew E. Lelling, Prosecutorial Discretion in a Time of Political Polarization, 54 SUFFOLK
U. L. REV. 479, 484 (2021) (citing Rani Molla, Social Media Is Making a Bad Political Situation
Worse, VOX (Nov. 10, 2020), https://www.vox.com/recode/21534345/polarization-election-socialmedia-filter-bubble).
75. Whether polarization trickles up (from the populace to Congress), or trickles down (from
Congress to the people), is hard to say.
76. Michael J. Teter, Congressional Gridlock’s Threat to Separation of Powers, 2013 WIS. L. REV.
1097, 1099 (2013).
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years. 77 The upcoming 118th Senate is only slightly less logjammed.78
Former President Barack Obama once remarked “[t]his country was
founded on compromise.”79 But compromise is proving ever more
difficult in the chambers of Congress. “[N]ame-calling, conspiracy
theories, and strategic obstructionism” have dominated federal legislative
politics for decades.80
In the Senate, parties rely more heavily than ever on cloture — the rule
that requires a vote by at least sixty members to bring a matter to a vote
for approval, sometimes referred to as the filibuster.81 Cloture freezes the
ability for measures to get approved when neither party has sufficient
votes to even bring a matter to the floor.82
It may come as no shock that there are many exceptions to cloture
filibuster (if there were not, Congress would never vote on anything at
all).83 Yet, these exceptions provide little relief. When a matter is not
stalled by the filibuster rule, it gets conscripted as a pawn in contentiously
partisan Senate battles. For example, consider presidential appointments,
one of the higher-profile votes not subject to filibuster.84 In the twentyfirst century, confirmation votes on the President’s nominees to the
Supreme Court have developed into hyper-partisan scenes of political

77. Party Division, U.S. SENATE (showing that the last time either party had a majority large
enough to guarantee passage of any measure presuming Senators all voted along party lines, even
measures requiring a supermajority, was the 89th Congress’s 68-seat Democratic majority in 1965-67),
https://www.senate.gov/history/partydiv.htm [https://perma.cc/BEU3-K7ZP] (last visited Apr. 23, 2022).
78. See e.g., Sam Gringlass, Here Are The Results in Georgia’s Senate Runoff Election, NPR (Dec.
06,
2022),
https://www.npr.org/2022/12/06/1139566883/georgia-runoff-results-raphael-warnockherschel-walker (confirming Rev. Raphael Warnock’s victory over Herschel Walker, securing a 51-49
Democratic Senate majority); Richard Luscombe, Herschel Walker’s Son Revels in Father’s Georgia
Senate Runoff
Defeat, Guardian (Dec. 07,
2022), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2022/dec/07/herschel-walker-son-christian-celebrates-defeat-georgia.
79. Barack Obama, President, White House Press Conference (Dec. 07, 2010),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2010/12/07/press-conference-president
[https://perma.cc/LU3M-2E7T].
80. McKay Coppins, The Man Who Broke Politics, ATLANTIC (Oct. 17, 2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/11/newt-gingrich-says-youre-welcome/570832/
[https://perma.cc/U8KR-ZGJ6] (claiming that these strategies have “poisoned America’s political culture
and plunged Washington into permanent dysfunction”).
81. Frances E. Lee, How Party Polarization Affects Governance, 18 ANN. REV. POLI. SCI. 261,
269 (2015) (citing BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING: NEW LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES IN
THE U.S. CONGRESS, 153-54 (CQ Press, 2012), who states that cloture has only been used as a frequent
practice since the 1990’s).
82. Id.
83. One report estimates that as many as 80% of the Senate votes cast in 2021 fell under some
exception to the filibuster rule. See Robert Mangas, Exceptions to the Senate Filibuster Rule: A Look at
Senate Votes in 2021, NAT’L L. REV (Jan. 5, 2022), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/exceptions-tosenate-filibuster-rule-look-senate-votes-2021 [https://perma.cc/TA9J-8Z3E].
84. Id.
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theater. Nominations alternatively get stalled85 or rushed86 as befits the
party in control of the Senate at the time.
Party polarization, it seems, has “tied [Congress] in knots, reducing . .
. legislative productivity . . . .”87 Political parties are growing “more
ideologically coherent and distinctive, headed by institutionally stronger
leaders inside government, and bolstered by committed activists and large
networks of party-allied organizations outside government.”88 These
machines of political power aim their focus more on electioneering, less
on deliberation and compromise toward a productive goal.89 The
governing body’s inability to overcome political differences and make
policy decisions can be reflected (if clumsily) by reviewing legislative
output: from 2011-13, the 112th Congress enacted only 283 laws,
compared to the 93rd Congress nearly four decades earlier, which enacted
649 laws.90 The Senate is also acting on a smaller portion of executive
nominations than they have in the past.91 While it’s true the Constitution
does not dictate a minimum number of laws or nominations upon which
the Congress must act, and further, some individuals may feel that the
decline in legislation merely reflects an appropriate scale of output for the
national legislature, polarization and gridlock have impacted Congress’
rate of execution of the legislative powers granted to it by to the
Constitution.92
C. Methods & Madness of Constitutional Amendment
The Comparative Constitutions Project’s study comparing the duration
85. In spring 2016, Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Merrick
Garland was nominated by President Barrack Obama (a Democrat) to replace the late Justice Antonin
Scalia on the Supreme Court. For over half a year, Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (a
Republican), along with the Senate Judiciary Committee, refused to hold a vote to confirm Judge Garland,
claiming that it was inappropriate to hold a SCOTUS nomination vote in a presidential election year. See
Ron Elving, What Happened With Merrick Garland in 2016 and Why it Matters Now, NPR (June 29,
2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/06/29/624467256/what-happened-with-merrick-garland-in-2016-andwhy-it-matters-now [https://perma.cc/7CQM-EKWY].
86. In late October 2020, mere weeks before that year’s presidential election, a Republicancontrolled Senate led by Mitch McConnell confirmed Amy Coney Barrett, formerly a judge on the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, to replace the late Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg on the Supreme Court.
See Seung Min Kim, Senate Confirms Barrett to Supreme Court, Cementing Its Conservative Majority,
WASH. POST (Oct. 26, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/senate-court-barretttrump/2020/10/26/df76c07e-1789-11eb-befb-8864259bd2d8_story.html [https://perma.cc/8EXP-RESD].
87. Lee, supra note 79, at 270
88. Id. at 275-76.
89. Id. at 276.
90. Teter, supra note 76, at 1104.
91. Id. at 1105 (citing Theodoric Meyer, Under Obama, More Appointments Go Unfilled,
PROPUBLICA (Feb. 27, 2013), http://www.propublica.org/article/under-obama-more-appointments-gounfilled).
92. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
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and endurance of every nation’s constitution shows that while the U.S.
Constitution is the oldest constitution still in effect, 93 it is also one of the
least amended.94 That is the case, in part, because it is one of the most
difficult to amend.95 The U.S. Constitution formally provides for its own
amendment via two methods: by a two-thirds vote to amend in both
chambers of Congress, or by a constitutional convention called by
application of two-thirds of the state legislatures.96 A convention may be
proposed “on one or many topics (or just a general call for convention
without proposing a specific topic).”97 The Supreme Court, however, has
a long history of amending the Constitution informally through judicial
review, creating sometimes “[m]ajor doctrinal shifts . . . without any
change in constitutional text.”98
The Constitution has been formally amended twenty-seven times since
1787, but there has never been a successful attempt to call a constitutional
convention in that time, and nearly three decades have passed since the
most recent amendment.99 This Part deals primarily with the formal
avenues for amendment laid out in Article V. The first sub-part deals with
Congress’ amendment record, and the second sub-part discusses the
pitfalls that have faced calls for convention. Finally, the last sub-part
introduces the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact, an agreement
which is not an Article V amendment, but will (if triggered) work
profound change on the American constitutional system.
1. Amendment by Congress: Once Difficult, Now Futile
The difficulty of actually enacting constitutional change through the
legislative process is almost impossible to overcome in the twenty-first
century.100 Not only must an amendment pass by a two-thirds vote in both
93. Zachary Elkins et al., Timeline of Constitutions, COMPAR. CONSTS. PROJECT (2022),
https://comparativeconstitutionsproject.org/chronology/ [https://perma.cc/54DB-2X3M].
94. Id.
95. See, e.g., PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N ON THE SUP. CT. OF THE U.S. 153 (Dec. 2021).
96. U.S. CONST. art. V. The term “formally” here distinguishes Article V procedures from informal
constitutional amendments via judicial review, as established by the Supreme Court in Marbury v.
Madison. See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
97. Abbey Pizel, A Constitutional Convention is Closer Than You Think, COLO. FISCAL INST. (Feb.
28, 2019) (citing U.S. CONST. art. V), https://www.coloradofiscal.org/a-constitutional-convention-iscloser-than-you-think/blog.
98. Eric J. Segall, Constitutional Change and the Supreme Court: The Article V Problem, 16 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 443, 443 (2013) (citing inter alia the many major shifts in doctrine on Congress’ authority
over interstate commerce and over regulation of the termination of a pregnancy as examples of Courtdriven constitutional change).
99. Pizel, supra note 97.
100. See, e.g., Jesse Wegman, Opinion, Thomas Jefferson Gave the Constitution 19 Years. Look
Where We Are Now., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 4, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/04/opinion/amendconstitution.html [https://perma.cc/SC8N-HS5M]; Jamelle Bouie, Opinion, The Constitution Was Made
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chambers of Congress, but the legislatures of three-quarters of the states
must then ratify the amendment.101 Out of more than 12,000 proposed
amendments, only twenty-seven have ever been adopted.102 The most
recent amendment was ratified in 1992, meaning there has not been any
amendment in this millennium.103 In addition, much of the ratification
process for the Twenty-Seventh Amendment occurred when it was first
introduced by James Madison in 1789.104 The most recent newlyproposed amendment, the Twenty-Sixth, took effect over half a century
ago in 1971 as a response to the Vietnam War.105
There have, of course, been attempts to enact more new amendments.
One proposal to note is the Equal Rights Amendment (“ERA”). The
amendment, first proposed in 1923, would have read: “Men and women
shall have equal rights throughout the United States and every
place subject to its jurisdiction.”106 The ERA, which sought to achieve the
same equal protection under the law for women as the Fourteenth
Amendment afforded to freed slaves, first experienced pushback because
of the worry that treating men and women equally in the law would
detrimentally ignore clear differences in biology.107 A “STOP ERA”
campaign launched in the 1970s on similar bases slowed what had been
growing support for the amendment; by the end of the 1970s, the ERA
had been approved by only thirty-five of the thirty-eight states required
add a proposed amendment to the text of the U.S. Constitution.108
Recently, the ERA has been approved by three more states (Nevada,
Illinois, and Virginia).109 If this were purely a numbers game, the ERA
would now be ratified. However, the deadline also needs to be

for
Us,
Not
the
Other
Way
Around,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
29,
2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/29/opinion/democracy-madison-robert-dahl.html
[https://perma.cc/8KK2-3H4M] (“[T]he barrier to constitutional amendment is impossibly high.”).
101. U.S. CONST. art. V.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. The 26th Amendment, RICHARD NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBR. & MUSEUM (June 17, 2021),
https://www.nixonlibrary.gov/news/26th-amendment [https://perma.cc/W2Z4-3XR6] (explaining that the
Twenty-Sixth Amendment, which lowered the voting age from twenty-one to eighteen, was a response to
the incongruity in allowing eighteen-year-olds to fight and die in war but not to vote for their nation’s
leadership).
106. S.J. Res. 21, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1923); see also 65 CONG. REC. 150 (1923).
107. Melissa Murray, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Century in the Making, 43 HARBINGER 91,
94 (2019) (showing that, especially with regard to workplace conditions and working hours, some women
opposed the ERA on the basis that they would lose important legal protections).
108. Id. at 95-96.
109. Id. at 97; see also Timothy Williams, Virginia Approves the E.R.A., Becoming the 38th State
to Back It, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 16, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/15/us/era-virginia-vote.html
[https://perma.cc/M75E-QZUE].

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol91/iss2/9

16

Rando: Reconstituting the United States: Could an Article V Convention P

578

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 91

considered. 110 Some argue that the fifty-year deadline written into the
ERA means that all approvals after 1983 are invalid; others contest that
since Article V makes no mention of amendment deadlines, Nevada’s,
Virginia’s, and Illinois’ approvals are valid.111 Thus, if the numbers didn’t
already make it clear, the ERA shows that politics impact amendment
ratification. If another state elects to approve the ERA, there is sure to be
a heated contest over its fate.
Before the current, decades-long amendment drought, there have
previously been multiple periods of profound constitutional amendment.
The most apparent example is the Bill of Rights. Ten of the twenty-seven
amendments were passed in 1791, as a response to criticism against the
Constitution.112 Another period of great change was the Reconstruction
after the Civil War, which saw passage of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and
Fifteenth Amendments, all methods by which Congress tried to overcome
the evils of slavery and societal racism.113 These periods brought drastic
change to the government and the American way of life.114 Together,
these two moments—post-Civil War and post-adoption of the
Constitution—account for nearly half the total amendments. Both
demonstrate how past “plastic hours” have been leveraged to work
immense change to this nation.
Today, the worsening polarization in Congress and among the states115
does not bode well for the possibility of congressional amendment. While
amending the Constitution was rare prior to Jan. 6, doing so in the current
political climate is likely impossible. Amendment by Congress requires a
two-thirds supermajority of both chambers to approve the proposed
amendment before sending it to the states for ratification. 116 The idea that
any constitutional amendment designed to address the crisis underlying
the Jan. 6 attack and to dispel the fear of continuing violence could pass

110. See Williams, supra note 109 (“Virginia’s decision does not seal the amendment’s addition to
the United States Constitution. A deadline . . . expired in 1982, so the future of the measure is uncertain,
and experts said the issue would likely be tied up in the courts and in the political sphere for years.”).
111. Id.
112. ZINN, infra note 152, at 99.
113. Id. at 198 (“The Thirteenth Amendment outlawed slavery[.] . . . The Fourteenth Amendment
repudiated the prewar Dred Scott decision [and] seemed to make a powerful statement for racial equality[.]
. . . The Fifteenth Amendment said: ‘The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied
or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude.’”).
114. Such as by enforcing new obligations upon the States or the federal government, or by
guaranteeing new rights to citizens and ensuring citizenship to new populations.
115. Elizabeth Kolbert, How Politics Got So Polarized, NEW YORKER (Dec. 27, 2021),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2022/01/03/how-politics-got-so-polarized (“Such is the state of
the union these days that no forum seems too small or too sleepy to be polarized . . . ‘[Y]ou would think
a civil war had already begun.’”).
116. U.S. CONST. art. V.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2022

17

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 91, Iss. 2 [2022], Art. 9

2022]

RECONSTITUTING THE UNITED STATES

579

through the 117th Congress is implausible, bordering on absurd. The
Senate once failed to so much as vote to approve the creation of a
commission to investigate the events of Jan. 6.117 So long as the filibuster
system remains in effect, accomplishing anything that requires a Senate
supermajority—let alone a supermajority of both chambers—will prove
unfeasible at best, and the “world’s greatest deliberative body” will do
little more than argue, accuse, and allow legislation to deflate. 118
2. Amendment by Convention: Risks & Results
If the fact that only twenty-seven of 12,000 proposed amendments have
been adopted proves that constitutional amendment is difficult via
Congress, the fact that none has been adopted by constitutional
convention might suggest that amendment by convention is impossible.
The language providing for constitutional convention is sparse. Article V
provides that an amendment can join the Constitution after being
proposed by “the legislatures of two thirds of the several states . . . [who]
shall call a convention . . . .”119 Alexander Hamilton envisioned
empowering the states to call a convention as being a safeguard against
federal overreach.120 James Madison believed this option was equally
valid as the Congressional amendment option.121 Why, then, have each of
the twenty-seven amendments ratified so far gone through the
Congressional approach—a two-thirds vote of approval by both Houses
of Congress?122
Currently, forty-two states have one or more resolutions to call an
Article V convention pending.123 More than a dozen of the resolutions
concern a proposed federal budget balancing amendment, several others
support a more open-ended “convention of states,” and some support an
effort to make a constitutional amendment overturning Citizens United v.
FEC, the 2010 case that significantly changed campaign finance law.124
117. Ryan Nobles et al, Senate Republicans Block January 6 Commission, CNN (May 28, 2021),
https://www.cnn.com/2021/05/28/politics/january-6-commission-vote-senate/index.html
[https://perma.cc/DH49-H2AV].
118. Susan Mulligan, The Filibuster: The Senate’s Glorified Tradition of Obstruction, U.S. NEWS
(Jan. 14, 2022), https://www.usnews.com/news/the-report/articles/2022-01-14/the-filibuster-the-senatesglorified-tradition-of-obstruction.
119. U.S. CONST. art. V.
120. THE FEDERALIST NO. 85 (Alexander Hamilton) (“We may safely rely on the disposition of the
State legislatures to erect barriers against the encroachments of the national authority.”).
121. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison) (“[The Constitution] equally enables the general
and the State governments to originate the amendment of errors . . . .”).
122. David E. Pozen & Thomas P. Schmidt, The Puzzles and Possibilities of Article V, 121 COLUM.
L. REV. 2317, 2370 (2021).
123. Pizel, supra note 97.
124. Jay Riestenberg, U.S. Constitution Threatened as Article V Convention Movement Nears
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In 2016, Texas Governor Greg Abbot initiated the Texas Plan, a campaign
to call a convention to propose amendments designed to check the power
of the federal government, which quickly garnered support from states
such as Tennessee, Indiana, and Oklahoma.125
The sparse constitutional language on Article V conventions is
deceptively simple. At closer glance, what the constitutional Framers left
unwritten hides chasms of dangers and uncertainty. A bipartisan,
nationwide collection of legislators, judges, and legal scholars oppose the
possibility of a convention due to these dangers.126 Difficulty of success
is far from alone in the gallery of risks associated with a convention.
There is also the possibility of a runaway convention. Vagueness in the
“convention of states” general proposals, and lack of guidance from
Article V, has made some people worry that a convention will overstep
its bounds.127 The original Constitution exceeded the bounds of the
convention’s call to amend the Articles of Confederation, after all.128
There is nothing in the Constitution to prevent a constitutional convention
from being expanded in scope to issues not raised in the convention calls
passed by the state legislatures. 129 Nor has Congress ever succeeded in
crafting a set of rules to govern a convention, despite multiple attempts.130
That any group of Americans organizing and running a constitutional
convention would be sailing into uncharted waters is a defining feature of
many critics’ concerns about Article V conventions.

Success, COMMON CAUSE (Mar. 21, 2018), https://www.commoncause.org/resource/u-s-constitutionthreatened-as-article-v-convention-movement-nears-success/
[https://perma.cc/8MJH-BNJU];
see
generally Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (holding that governmental
limitations on campaign finance contributions by corporations violate the Free Speech Clause of the First
Amendment).
125. Tom Lindsay, The U.S. Constitution: An Illegal Document?, FORBES (May 25, 2016),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/tomlindsay/2016/05/25/was-americas-1787-constitutional-conventionillegal/?sh=1d20b0c74d9c [https://perma.cc/QWK8-2TLF].
126. Riestenberg, supra note 124 (quoting Supreme Court Justices Warren Berger, Antonin Scalia,
and Arthur Goldberg, Solicitors General Archibald Cox and Walter E. Dellinger, and more than two dozen
law professors, all citing concerns about the lack of precedent and appropriate guidelines for such a
venture).
127. Id. (“There is nothing in the Constitution to prevent a constitutional convention from being
expanded in scope to issues not raised in convention calls . . . .”).
128. Lindsay, supra note 123.
129. Id.; see also Michael Leachman & David A. Super, States Likely Could Not Control
Constitutional Convention on Balanced Budget Amendment or Other Issues, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL'Y
PRIORITIES 2 (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/7-16-14sfp.pdf
[https://perma.cc/22GZM389] (“There is no guarantee that a convention could be limited to a particular
set of issues . . . .”)
130. Noah Rothman, A Pander For the Ages, COMMENTARY (Dec. 31, 2015),
https://www.commentary.org/noah-rothman/a-pander-for-the-ages/ [https://perma.cc/G642-QSP2].
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3. The Potential for Amendment by Compact:
A Note on the NPVIC
In addition to the constitutionally-enumerated methods of amendment
described above, there has in this millennium developed a potential
creative solution for amendment — something of a middle path between
the strict requirements for congressional amendment and the risky road of
constitutional convention. This creative alternative concerns the Electoral
College. Under the Constitution, every state may select its own method
for appointing delegates to the Electoral College, the body that selects the
next President of the United States.131 Many states operate under a statewide popular vote system — that state’s delegates will vote for the
candidate who won the popular vote in that state.132 The result of the
varied appointment system is that, from time to time, the candidate who
wins the national popular vote loses the presidential election, having
failed to secure enough electors.133
As an attempt to remedy the situation, the National Popular Vote
Interstate Compact (“NPVIC”) requires each member state to appoint its
delegates to the candidate who wins the national popular vote. 134 In
theory, once a number of states representing 270 or more Electoral
College delegates have signed on to the NPVIC, then all future
presidential elections will go to the national popular vote winner. 135
Whether the NPVIC is ultimately allowed to hold sway over election
outcomes, however, may ultimately depend on Congress or the Supreme
Court due to the Constitution’s Compact Clause, which forbids states
from entering certain interstate agreements without Congressional
approval.136 If Congress does not approve the NPVIC, it is possible that a
state party to the compact will seek a contrary decision from the highest
Court.
The NPVIC, if enabled, would clearly alter the constitutional system
of Article II by replacing states’ freedom to choose their own methods of
appointing electors with a process that automatically selects the national
popular vote winner, relegating the Electoral College to historical

131. U.S. CONST. art. II, § I.
132. Ronak Patel, Chapter 188: Forget College, You’re Popular! A Review of the National Popular
Vote Interstate Compact, 43 MCGEORGE L. REV. 645 (2012).
133. Id.; see also 5 of 46 Presidents Came into Office Without Winning the Popular Vote, NATIONAL
POPULAR VOTE, https://www.nationalpopularvote.com/5-46-presidents-came-office-without-winningnational-popular-vote [https://perma.cc/9KWH-NFET] (listing John Quincy Adams, Rutherford B.
Hayes, Benjamin Harrison, George W. Bush, and Donald Trump as the five individuals who won
presidential elections despite losing the national popular vote).
134. Patel, supra note 132, at 646.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 647.
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obsolescence. Crucially, the NPVIC would achieve this result outside of
the formal amendment processes outlined in Article V, relying only on
widespread consensus and the Compact Clause. Furthermore, assuming
(perhaps naively) that the citizens of states not party to the compact do
not violently protest, the compact will have achieved its goal peacefully.
When considering potential peaceful solutions to the current crisis and the
possibility it will erupt in debilitating violence, lawmakers should take the
NPVIC into consideration.
III. DISCUSSION: CONVENTION, 2026
Jan. 6 was a symptom of the nation’s constitutionally violent disease;
it was not the disease itself. This is why the nation has yet to experience
the profound social change to be expected from “plastic hours” such as
the American Revolution, or the Civil and Vietnam Wars. Thus, the
potential to enact sweeping, nation-saving change remains.
This Section imagines a hypothetical near-future in which the nation
has capitalized upon the urgent need to peacefully resolve its many
differences by calling a constitutional convention. This fiction takes place
in 2026, to coincide with the 250th anniversary of independence from
Great Britain. The delegates gather with a singular mandate:
To re-evaluate the original Constitution, every clause and amendment, and
forge a new series of amendments that reflect the needs of modern America
in such a way as to prevent nation-destroying violence.

Before the convention can take place, preliminary questions must be
answered. Note that each of these questions could conceivably inflame
passions and lead to, if not violent insurrection, then vicious argument.
Who, for example, will be on the roster of delegates? Perhaps it will
comprise the members of Congress. But if so, why hold a convention at
all? That is to say, what would differentiate the convention from an
ordinary session of Congress? Should the states instead appoint separate
delegates, subject to the states’ own appointment methods as is currently
the practice concerning the Electoral College? Should it be left to a
popular vote? Further, should each state have a number of delegates
proportionate to its population (as in the House of Representatives), or
should each state have an equal number of delegates (as in the Senate)?
Perhaps the more significant problem is that the question of who gets to
decide the answers to these other questions is equally unclear. There is no
rubric for this in the Constitution.137
Assume for the moment that these initial questions have been
reasonably answered without sparking panic, outrage, and violence. The
137. See, e.g., Riestenberg, supra note 113.
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delegates arrive safely at the convention, 138 ready to partake in peaceful
(if heated) discussion about the nation’s issues and its governing
document.
Unlike the United States in 1787, the nation today is not in the nascent
stages of self-government in the aftermath of a revolutionary war. The
United States has endured nearly 250 years under the current Constitution,
longer than that of any other nation, and there have been amendments
when enough of the government has agreed that the Constitution should
change. But the previous Section established that the United States is
experiencing a constitutional crisis, one illustrated by Jan. 6’s events at
the Capitol and which may yet incite further violence. Whether
insurrections, revolutions, and civil war result or peace prevails, the
nation exists in a unique moment of peril, a result of polarization and
norm breaking.139 This Section engages in a thought experiment: can the
2026 convention offer a way out of the crisis?
Thomas Jefferson once wrote to James Madison, “[N]o society can
make a perpetual constitution, or even a perpetual law. The earth belongs
always to the living generation.”140 Over two centuries later, a 1993 study
of all applications for constitutional convention showed that there were
forty-five states “with their lights ‘on’ for a general convention,” though
by 2011, that number had reduced to thirty-three on account of several
recissions.141 Using the 2026 Article V convention as a fictional
framework, this Section demonstrates why calling a constitutional
convention may not be an ideal reaction to the current crisis. But first,
Part A will show that a convention has the potential for some positive
impacts.

138. But where will it take place – in Philadelphia, where Independence was declared? In
Washington, D.C., the nation’s capitol? In some place more geographically central? It’s yet another topic
that sparks more questions than answers; another area where history and the Constitution leave no
guidance and no precedent.
139. See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith, Will Donald Trump Destroy the Presidency?, ATLANTIC (Oct.
2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/10/will-donald-trump-destroy-the-presidenc
y/537921/ [https://perma.cc/27W3-WXJP]; see also David Montgomery, The Abnormal Presidency,
WASH. POST MAG. (Nov. 10, 2020) (detailing twenty presidential norms broken by Donald Trump,
including the tax release tradition, the norm against personally profiting from official business, and abuse
of the powers of appointment and pardon), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/lifestyle/mag
azine/trump-presidential-norm-breaking-list/ [https://perma.cc/8SSM-ZGU4].
140. Letter
from
Thomas
Jefferson
to
James
Madison
(Sept.
6,
1789),
https://jeffersonpapers.princeton.edu/selected-documents/thomas-jefferson-james-madison
[https://perma.cc/J6QQ-WDGZ].
141. Pozen & Schmidt, supra note 122, at 2371 (citing Michael Stokes Paulsen, How to County to
Thirty-Four: The Constitutional Case for a Constitutional Convention, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 837,
839-55 (2011)).
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A. A More Perfect Union:
The Benefits of an Article V Convention
The Constitution, and by extension the United States of America, has
never been a perfect document (or nation). As the remarks of President
Jefferson show, it was not intended to be. “The framers were not
philosophers searching for a description of an ideal system . . . They were
practical men, eager to achieve a stronger national government.” 142 The
Constitution was only meant to establish a government that was more
perfect than that which came before it.143 Whether by replacement or
amendment, creating a more perfect union should be the ultimate goal of
any attempt to change the Constitution — to root out the flaws in our
system and attempt to alleviate them. This Part will illuminate key ways
that the 2026 constitutional convention could achieve that goal. Sub-part
(i) discusses pacifism and consensus-building in the face of crisis, before
sub-part (ii) discusses representation.
1. Building Consensus
In future constitutional violence, “[p]artisans on both sides are likely
to be better armed and more willing to inflict harm than they were in
2020.”144 And it is likely that there are actors on both sides of the political
aisle who fervently agree that “a little rebellion now and then is a good
thing.”145 People on both extreme ends of the political spectrum are, so to
speak, raring to go.146 As Jan. 6 clearly demonstrated, there remain those
who, discontented with the outcome or structure of American life, are
willing to take up arms and inflict harm in the course of conducting a
“little rebellion.”
But when parties are extremely divided, reaching peaceful consensus
as to the disputed topic is a necessary alternative to violence. Consensus
can represent a societal convergence of public opinion, or the process (and
142. Bouie, supra note 100 (quoting ROBERT A. DAHL, HOW DEMOCRATIC IS THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION?, 38 (Yale University Press, 2001)).
143. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
144. Kagan, supra note 53.
145. Zinn, infra note 152, at 95 (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Jan. 30,
1787)).
146. On the extreme left, the Socialist Rifle Association, at least in part a natural disaster recovery
nonprofit, also engages in education and advocacy for gun rights with a slant on supporting workers’
rights. See SOCIALIST RIFLE ASS’N, https://socialistra.org/ [https://perma.cc/7KXV-9HLR]. On the
extreme right, groups such as the Proud Boys (who were involved in both the Unite the Right Rally and
the Jan. 6 attack) encourage “political” violence in support of their view of Western values. See Matthew
Kriner & Jon Lewis, Pride & Prejudice: The Violent Evolution of the Proud Boys, 14 CTC SENTINEL 26
(2021), https://ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/CTC-SENTINEL-062021.pdf [https://perma.c
c/F2JT-ZH32].
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result) of coming to agreement amongst a group.147 “The most important
thing a convention would do is to simply jump-start and conduct a
national conversation that we’re not having,” says University of Texas
Constitutional Law Professor Sanford Levinson.148
Building conflict-avoiding consensus between the poles of American
political ideology is reason enough to call delegates from the fifty states
to participate in a constitutional convention designed to rededicate the
nation to some of its purported ideals, such as opportunity, liberty, peace,
and justice. After all, “arguments over the filibuster will seem quaint in
three years if the American political system enters a crisis for which the
Constitution offers no remedy.”149
To achieve consensus, a deliberative body “attempts to integrate the
insights of all members in order to find a solution that incorporates all
points of view and that all members can support.”150 Some readers might
call this a naïve fantasy; others might point out that a convention would
be redundant since this type of deliberation is Congress’ raison d’etre. To
those with a pacifist mindset, and indeed to the 83% of Americans who
thought that Jan. 6 threatened democracy, this fantasy, naïve or not,
should seem preferable to insurrection and violent overthrow. Clearly, no
convention in the United States of the twenty-first century would be
devoid of argument — things would almost certainly get a little more
heated than your average faculty lounge debate. Even so, the hope is that
the act of calling delegates together with the purpose of engaging in these
necessary debates would prevent actual, harmful violence. The peacefully
achieved result of a convention that represents the careful and considered
deliberation of its framers is preferable to gunfire and marauders in the
hallways of government institutions.
In any case, Sections II(B) and II(C) showed that the world’s greatest
deliberative body is failing to deliberate. Congress cannot achieve the
consensus necessary to reach a peaceful end to this crisis if it fails to do
the work of consensus-building. Thus, it is possible that putting the
Constitution into the hands of a body whose members do not serve, nor
have ever served, in Congress, has the potential to achieve what Congress
cannot.

147. Dorothy J. Della Noce, The Beaten Path to Mediator Quality Assurance: The Emerging
Narrative of Consensus and Its Institutional Functions, 19 OHIO STATE J. DISP. RESOL. 937, 940 (2004)
(citing KATHRYN A. WELCH ET AL., BUILDING CONSENSUS: IMPROVING QUALITY IN DECISION MAKING
6-7 (1994)).
148. Seitz-Wald, supra note 50.
149. Kagan, supra note 54.
150. Della Noce, supra note 147, at 940.
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2. Giving Everybody a Voice
The document that gave birth to a government supposedly created
“of the people, by the people, and for the people”151 was written with input
from a scant minority of its population—both at the time, and in relation
to the nation’s current demographic makeup. In 1787, a handful of
wealthy, white, male landowners met in Philadelphia at the Constitutional
Convention.152 There were no slaves, no free non-white men, no women,
and no un-propertied men amongst the delegates. 153 On the contrary, the
Constitution was a “slaveholder’s document,” written in part by slaveowning delegates and designed in part to protect slavery as an
institution.154 It did not mention the nation’s very small population of free
African-Americans, either.155 Nor were there any delegates of Native
American descent, although the topic of conversation had direct impacts
on Native American interests and, some believe, may have been partially
inspired by Native American ideology.156 The Constitution treats native
populations, similar to slaves, as distinctly other—they were not counted
for representation in Congress, not taxed, and had no standing to sue in
federal courts.157 As the icing on the cake to prove that the Constitution
of 1787 did not represent the full nation it purported to govern, it was
approved by ratification of only nine of the thirteen states that existed at
the time.158 More than showing that unanimity did not take place, this
151. Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863); see
also James A. Langley, Opinion, Who Coined ‘Government of the People, By the People, For the
People’?, WASH. POST (Mar. 31, 2017) (noting that Lincoln evidently borrowed the phrase from John
Wycliffe’s introduction to his 1384 Bible translation), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/whocoined-government-of-the-people-by-the-people-for-the-people/2017/03/31/12fc465a-0fd5-11e7-aa572ca1b05c41b8_story.html [https://perma.cc/2DG3-BHGJ].
152. HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 91 (HarperCollins 2003).
153. Id.
154. Paul Finkelman, The Color of Law, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 937, 969-71 (1993) (explaining how
the Three-Fifths compromise, the Fugitive Slave Clause, the amendment provisions of Article V, and
other parts of the Constitution all supported the slaveholding delegates and those like them whom they
represented).
155. Id. at 963.
156. Meet the Framers of the Constitution, NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://www.archives.gov/foundingdocs/founding-fathers [https://perma.cc/NL8R-EFHH] (last visited March 16, 2020); see also Mike Lee,
How an Iroquois Chief Helped Write the U.S. Constitution, DAILY BEAST (Aug. 13, 2017),
https://www.thedailybeast.com/how-an-iroquois-chief-helped-write-the-us-constitution (“In his speech,
Canasatego introduced the colonists to the federalist ideas that bound the disparate tribes into unity: it was
a bond that encouraged unity, especially in matters of defense, even as it supported the independence of
each tribe when it came to self-government.”).
157. Finkelman, supra note 154, at 948.
158. This is somewhat misleading: As the ninth state to ratify, New Hampshire made the
Constitution legally effective on June 21, 1788. But the document was ratified by Virginia four days later,
New York the following month, North Carolina in November, and Rhode Island in May 1790. See U.S.
Constitution Ratified, HISTORY.COM (June 18, 2020), https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/u-sconstitution-
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signals that the Founding Fathers did not feel that unanimity was required
for the new Constitution to take effect. 159 The Constitution did not, at the
time it was ratified, need to represent every state before it could take
effect.
Thirty-seven new states have been added to the Union in the centuries
since the Constitution’s ratification. Furthermore, significant steps have
been taken to fold some of the unrepresented groups into the American
enterprise, guaranteeing citizenship, suffrage, and representation to
groups such as former slaves, African-Americans, and women.160 These
steps, important though they are, hardly imply that problems of racial or
sex-based discrimination have disappeared. 161 Notably, Native
Americans remain ostracized and still lack many of the rights that nonNative citizens of the United States possess.162 The nation might the look
drastically different now if women, and non-white persons, had been
heard at the convention of 1787.
The Fifteenth, Nineteenth, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments have
greatly expanded the criteria for what portions of the population are
allowed to vote in the United States.163 These Amendments, respectively,
guarantee that the right to vote will not be denied on the basis of race, or
of sex, and reduce the voting age from twenty-one to eighteen.164 Ignoring
for a moment the problem of gerrymandering, 165 the right to vote is the
primary method for ordinary citizens to affect the direction of
government. Through the right to vote, these populations are now able to
elect leaders and representatives based on whose platform agrees with
their ideals. These amendments, though they should be neither ignored
nor diminished, are akin to welcoming a new resident into a broken
house,166 rather than designing a new house together, one suitable for all
its residents’ needs. Calling a new constitutional convention would be a
prime opportunity to reassess the country’s guiding principles —

ratified#:~:text=As%20dictated%20by%20Article%20VII,nine%20of%20the%2013%20states
[https://perma.cc/SD8S-BN4M].
159. Eventually it did, as all the states did eventually ratify the Constitution.
160. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XV, XIX.
161. See, e.g., Finkelman, supra note 154, at 938 (“For much of this century American
constitutional history has been the history of the color line.”).
162. Id. at 949.
163. U.S. CONST. amends. XV, XIX, XXVI.
164. Id.
165. The process of drawing or altering voting districts in such a way as to unduly benefit one party
or another. See, e.g., Julia Kirschenbaum & Michael Li, Gerrymandering Explained, BRENNAN CTR. FOR
JUST. (Aug. 12, 2021), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/gerrymanderingexplained [https://perma.cc/N9X6-MLFW].
166. Perhaps it would be more accurate to say: welcoming a new resident into a house intentionally
designed with booby-traps.
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including inter alia, “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,”167 or “life,
liberty, [and] property”168 — to ensure the U.S. government is able to
effectuate those principles on behalf of everybody under its care.
As suggested above, the demographic makeup of the 2026
convention’s delegates would not need to be based in any way on the
current or past makeup of Congress. If it were organized as an entity
separate from the existing political structure, the convention would be an
ideal place for the populations who have been given the right to vote since
the time of initial ratification of the Constitution to have even more direct
impact than the right to vote allows (especially in a gerrymandered and
hyper-partisan government). Instead of merely voting for leaders and
representatives, populations who were not represented in 1787 could have
a seat at the table when it comes to deciding how the nation is to be
governed moving forward.
Thus, there are some benefits to the possibility of replacing the U.S.
Constitution in an Article V convention. In some ways, it could be exactly
what the nation needs to move beyond the current climate and to forge a
better future. Consequently, the next Part demonstrates how the idea plays
out when an Article V convention is followed to is logical conclusion.
B. Welcome to the Jungle: Conventional Dangers
The benefits invoked in the previous Part are desirable. However, the
justification for the 2026 convention is to unite the splitting factions of
American politics in order to avoid violence. One major element the
mandate lacked, however, was specificity. Which exact constitutional
clause(s) should the delegates seek to amend? The problem of Jan. 6, and
the larger crisis of which the attack was a major symptom, cannot be
easily pinned down to one or two clauses. The reader should keep that
fault in mind throughout this Part.
The proceedings themselves suggest countless areas of danger which,
taken together, may suggest that an Article V convention is too risky an
endeavor to be worth attempting, even in the face of today’s extraordinary
circumstances. There is a lot that could go wrong, and the following subparts each address corresponding dangers (though they are all interrelated). 169 Sub-part 1 tackles the threat of a runaway convention, while
sub-part 2 discusses the risk a convention would pose to existing
institutions and doctrines of constitutional law. Sub-part 3 briefly
discusses the unspoken threat underlying both of the previous sub-parts:
167. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, para 2 (U.S. 1776).
168. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
169. The list is not comprehensive, but it attempts to address several of the most common critiques
of any proposal to hold an Article V convention.
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would a constitutional convention have the power to “cancel” the
Constitution altogether? Finally, sub-part 4 briefly illustrates various
other risks.
1. Run Away! The Convention is Here
(and It’s Really, Really Big!)
The 1787 convention that drafted and debated the U.S. Constitution
was a runaway convention—though only in the strict sense that its
mandate was to amend, not replace, the Articles of Confederation.170 Few
since have argued that the nation would have been better had the
convention stayed within the bounds of its mandate.
But the proposed mandate for the hypothetical 2026 convention is
sparse in its language—to forge new amendments that reflect the needs of
modern America in a way that avoids nation-destroying violence. Like
Article V itself, this offers little in the way of limitation or guidance, and
offers the delegates extraordinary leeway in interpretation. That is to say,
instead of crafting a few amendments designed to build consensus among
a polarized nation so as to avoid violence, the convention’s delegates
could decide to scrap the whole Constitution and draft a new one. Even if
the mandate were less open-ended, it is unlikely that any clause could
keep the delegates beholden to its limitations. Once the convention
begins, the American people could hang their hopes for a desirable
outcome on three things only: the bounds of the convention’s mandate,
faith that the delegates will execute their positions in good faith within
those bounds, and the historical weight of a Constitution that was framed
for a predominately agrarian society but now governs an industrialized
superpower.171
Some Americans may feel that violent overthrow of the constitutional
system poses a bigger risk than a peacefully deliberated rewrite. There is,
after all, no place for violence in our democratic system.172 The crisis that
is currently underway has shown that constitutional violence is not out of
the question; indeed, although many might consider violence against the
government to be “unfathomable,” such violence has already taken place
and is likely to happen again.
To these Americans, it may seem more productive at this stage, and
more conducive to a peaceful future for this country, to call a convention

170. See Lindsay, supra note 128.
171. Perhaps there is another hope for peace in this convention: that one side of the political
spectrum might enforce the boundaries of the convention’s mandate through force of arms, in which case
Americans would know that the text of their original Constitution was relatively safe while its spirit was
arguably shattered, along with the ultimate goal of the convention itself.
172. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 574 (1965).
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and allow a coalition of citizens representing modern America to take
measures they deem necessary to guard against the threat of a runaway
convention, than to allow that fear to forestall any efforts to engage in a
convention at all. The possibility of a runaway convention may in fact be
an opportunity for a convention to do exactly what a convention is meant
to do: allow the parties to decide the scope and powers of their own
government.
Ultimately, without enforceable limitations, the Constitution would be
at the whims of the delegates. Any faction of them with enough influence
could hijack the convention and, if not rewrite the whole Constitution,
pick and choose their favorite clauses and eviscerate the remainder. The
hypothetical 2026 convention then dissolves into something no better
than the Congress of today: divided, partisan, cutthroat, and toxic.
2. Done with Doctrine:
The Convention’s Threat to Government & Law
The difficulty of constitutional amendment in the United States lends
itself to a degree of comfortable stability in government. Concurrent to
the other fears associated with a runaway convention, there is the worry
that a convention resulting in a new Constitution will also cause damage
to the existing institutions of American government—both those
mentioned in the Constitution (such as the Presidency, Congress, the
Supreme Court, the Post Office) and those not mentioned (such as FEMA,
OSHA, and other federal agencies). Without restrictions, those delegates
who wish to adhere closely to the convention’s mandate may not be
competent to protect the bicameral legislature, or the office of President.
It is equally uncertain to what degree the clauses of a newly written
Constitution would affect long-standing and well-respected doctrines in
constitutional law, such as the First Amendment freedoms of speech and
of the press, or the Fifth Amendment right against compulsory selfincrimination as protected by Miranda warnings.173 If the 2026
convention is heavily influenced by a liberal majority, it stands to reason
they might eliminate Second Amendment rights that conservatives tend
to protect. Vice versa, a conservative majority could gut Obergefell v.
Hodges’ protection of the equal right to marriage for same-sex couples. 174
Would it be appropriate for a majority of the delegates to decide these
important constitutional questions, questions they were not called upon to
answer?
Likely not. As such, Americans may distrust the resulting document

173. See generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
174. See generally Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015).
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due to lack of precedent since 1787, 175 and may lose confidence in the
stability and security of their government in years to come.176 There is no
safeguard stopping disgruntled citizens from asking their states to call a
convention once a decade, once a year, once a month.177
3. Constitutional Cancel Culture
Due to these concerns, it is likely that many Americans would criticize
this hypothetical 2026 convention as being the product of “cancel
culture,” or the modern trend of boycotting celebrities or corporations that
exhibit qualities found to be morally problematic.178 Political actors have,
in recent years, weaponized the fear of being attacked by trigger-happy
cancel mobs to gain political advantage, suggesting that the cancel mob
wants others to live in fear.179 With such rhetoric, politicians can convince
their base to vote against what they say the cancel mob supports.180 It’s
easy enough to see how a convention could be accused of “cancelling”
the current Constitution, or at least delegitimizing the institutions it
creates.
This presents an immense hurdle for the 2026 convention to overcome.
The convention’s organizers would need to be careful about their
messaging. It would not bode well for a convention call to be shut down
on the fear that the end goal is to “cancel” the Constitution. If a convention
were to occur, it would be imperative to find a way for most of the current
Constitution, the institutions it creates (such as Congress, the Presidency,
and the Supreme Court), and our constitutional rights to emerge more or
less intact. Because this is an outrageously difficult goal, cancel concerns
will be especially prevalent during the ratification and transition period
between the current Constitution and whatever the convention produces,
and would likely continue for a long time beyond ratification.
On the other hand, because of the current constitutional crisis,
175. Pozen & Schmidt, supra note 122, at 2370.
176. Of course, faith in the stability of American institutions has already eroded considerably in the
past five years. See Goldsmith, supra note 139 (“That’s one reason Donald Trump was elected. His assault
on those institutions, and the defiant reactions to his assault, will further diminish that trust and make it
yet harder to resolve social and political disputes.”); see also David Brooks, America is Having a Moral
Convulsion, ATLANTIC (Oct. 5, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/10/collapsinglevels-trust-are-devastating-america/616581/ [https://perma.cc/GGM4-TTSV] (“Americans haven’t just
lost faith in institutions; they’ve come to loathe them, even to think that they are evil.”).
177. Granted, there is also nothing to say doing so would necessarily be harmful.
178. Aja Romano, The Second Wave of “Cancel Culture”, VOX (May 5, 2021),
https://www.vox.com/22384308/cancel-culture-free-speech-accountability-debate (showing that cancel
culture is used by both sides of the political spectrum merely to silence or ignore others, rather than to
truly hold them accountable).
179. Id.
180. Id.
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replacing the Constitution could be good public relations, so to speak.
Branding constitutional reform via convention as a more democratic
process than the Congressional amendment procedure could garner a lot
of favor among the American populace. Satisfaction with democratic
society is at a low point in the United States.181 American citizens could
become more content with the operation of their government if they were
given a more direct part to play in its crafting (via convention).182
4. The Final Frontier:
More Challenges & Unknowns
The Twenty-Seventh Amendment and the ERA both prove that it can
take quite some time to get an amendment ratified. In the event that the
hypothetical 2026 convention does not runaway with its mandate and, as
instructed, delivers a handful of new amendments, the nation may have to
wait months, years, decades, or even centuries before the proposed
amendments are finally ratified. This may beg the question: why do it at
all? In fact, this reality could almost support an argument that the
convention should, in the spirit of 1787, overstep its bounds and write
itself a clause ratifying its own output by some lesser criteria than the
three-fourths vote of states required by Article V.
The biggest foreseeable obstacle and reason to avoid an Article V
convention is this: if Jan. 6 was bad, what happens when a convention
gets underway could be much worse. All the foregoing risks are things a
critic, a crowd, or an angry mob could latch onto as incentives to engage
in even more drastic forms of violence. A convention could end up
exposing the nation to a prevalent risk of more violence, under the
auspices of a peaceful solution to the problems violence posed in the first
place.
And how peaceful would the convention itself really be? Perhaps the
delegates would like to think of themselves (or their constituents would
like to envision them) as Hamiltonian, Jeffersonian, or Madisonian—that
is, as people with closely held, passionate convictions who yet retain the
ability to put aside self-interest and debate with calm decorum when the

181. See, e.g., Roberto Foa & Andrew James Klassen, Where People Are Satisfied With Democracy
and Why, CONVERSATION (Feb. 11, 2020), https://theconversation.com/where-people-are-satisfied-withdemocracy-and-why-130979 [https://perma.cc/2FCH-3YWC].
182. Id. (engagement and agency in the civic process is one of four absolutely essential pillars to
citizen satisfaction in a democratic society, along with limiting polarization); but see also Richard Wike
& Alexandra Castillo, Many Around the World Are Disengaged From Politics, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Oct. 17,
2018) (civic engagement – participating in the process of government – normally does not extend beyond
occasionally exercising the right to vote), https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2018/10/17/internationalpolitical-engagement/ [https://perma.cc/F49S-HZK6].
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need arises. 183 But Congress has not always been a model of calm
decorum,184 and among the many other elements for which the 2026
convention lacks sufficient controls, it would be difficult to ensure that
the delegates maintained their own peace.
IV. CONCLUSION: AN UNCONVENTIONAL SOLUTION
It is perhaps both a blessing and a curse that, no matter what happens
at the hypothetical 2026 convention, it could not hope to stifle Americans’
political passion. No constitution has the power to put an end to fervent
debate about the elements of our constitutional system and their proper
role. Nor should any constitutional amendment (or replacement) seek to
do so. Debate has been prevalent throughout American history.185 But an
Article V constitutional convention, with the lofty goal to encourage more
profound and engaged debate than at any point since the 1787 convention,
may not be the appropriate measure to build consensus and enforce the
strength of long-standing principles of American constitutional
democracy that are in danger from the rising tide of constitutional
violence.
It may still be too soon after Jan. 6 to accurately predict what the postattack landscape of American government will look like. But the tea
leaves are there for the reading. That which once seemed “unfathomable”
has taken place, time and time again. That civil war now seems less than
entirely “unfathomable” should set off alarms of nuclear proportions. The
disparate sides of the political spectrum must come together to peacefully
reach consensus about the future of the United States or risk a violent
unraveling of the Union in the face of seemingly insurmountable political
and social forces. However, it appears that an Article V convention may
not be the appropriate venue in which to achieve consensus, despite the
potential for a convention to increase civic engagement and interest in the
Constitution.
183. Which is not to say that Hamilton, Jefferson, or Madison necessarily possessed those qualities.
Whether they did or not, a certain amount of American mythmaking has imbued such attributes upon the
founding generation. See, e.g., HEIKE PAUL, THE MYTHS THAT MADE AMERICA: AN INTRODUCTION TO
AMERICAN STUDIES, 197 (2014) (“The myth of the Founding Fathers constitutes an American master
narrative which has enshrined a group of statesmen and politicians of the revolutionary and postrevolutionary period as personifications of the origin of American nationhood, republicanism, and
democratic culture.”).
184. See, e.g., Faye Fiore, Lack of Decorum a Long Capitol Tradition, L.A. T IMES (May 19, 1993),
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1995-05-19-mn-3468-story.html
[https://perma.cc/5TQ9TJPG] (describing gun duels and wrestling matches among members of Congress, and claiming that “the
only thing out of whack about today’s Congress is the public’s expectation that it ought to behave better”).
185. See, e.g., PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N ON THE SUP. CT. OF THE U.S., 7 (Dec. 2021) (“[L]awmakers
and the public, throughout the Nation’s history, have been attentive to and engaged in debate about . . .
the constitutional system.”).
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All the same, the crisis is still underway, and some solution must be
reached. It would be unwise to let the urgency in the wake of Jan. 6 pass
without taking some action. Fortunately, this discussion has identified a
path toward a potential solution in the NPVIC. Though the compact is
narrowly tailored to the issue of national popular voting in the presidential
election (and, if it works, will only work because it leverages the existing
Electoral College system to achieve its goal), the method it uses to amend
the constitutional system may signify that the nation is not limited to a
choice between Congress, convention, or judicial review to achieve
change.
When it comes to hyper-partisanship in our legislatures, on our
televisions, and amongst our fellow citizens, a multi-state compact like
the NPVIC may present a holy grail solution. Multiple benefits would
attach to such a solution: (1) it would allow lawmakers to focus on a
carefully contained issue, with little chance to bleed into other issues —
for example, election security or fraud, which has been the source of so
much tension and violence, including Jan. 6; and (2) it could draw on
existing institutions, thereby limiting the need for quarrels regarding who,
when, where, etc. This suggests the possibility of an alternative strategy
to the too-difficult and too-risky methods the Constitution’s Framers
dictated in Article V. If the NPVIC comes into effect, it should inspire
lawmakers to look for similar “one-off” consensus-building solutions to
national problems, starting with those likely to be the seeds of future
violent activity.
The hypothetical 2026 convention was based on the theory that an
enterprising group of delegates and deliberators representing the vast
spectrum of American identity could identify specific clauses within the
Constitution that could, with amendment, shore up the political chasms
that divide the nation and thereby prevent constitutional violence from
evolving into civil war. Though the risks of a runaway convention and
damage to American institutions are too great to endorse in good
conscience, the NPVIC may suggest that, with creativity, a sufficiently
large group of states can develop a peace compact that could yet bring the
nation back from the brink of violence.
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